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CONSIDERING WHAT WORKERS WANT
Larry W. Huntert
About ten percent of United States workers in the private sector be-
long to trade unions. Nearly all of the remaining ninety percent are em-
ployed in workplaces without formally recognized collective representa-
tion.2 This stands in sharp contrast to collective representation in other
industrialized countries: nearly thirty percent of German workers belong to
unions, for example, and eighty percent of German workers are covered by
collective agreements that extend from the union to the non-union sectors.3
Do American workers want more collective representation in the
workplace than they currently have? Yes, they clearly do. Millions of
Americans would like to have workplace institutions through which they
could engage management in discussions or negotiations over the terms
and conditions of work.4 Considering the representation gap is particularly
important, because there is at present a reasonably clear consensus that
freedom of association in the workplace, and the rights of workers to or-
ganize and bargain collectively, should be regarded as fundamental human
rights.5 Support for the institutions through which these rights should be
exercised is therefore an important issue for public policy, and an issue on
which debate should be informed by a thorough understanding of the ex-
pressed interests of the workers who would participate.
The motivations underlying workers' desires for representation are
varied, as are workers' ideas about how they might like such representation
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to be organized.6 Generally, the gap between desired and actual represen-
tation suggests that labor law reform might bring workers' interests more
closely in line with their experiences. The diversity of twenty-first century
workers and workplaces, however, raises challenges for the content of such
reform. Effective design of new representative institutions, as well as pol-
icy supporting these institutions, will have to take this diversity into ac-
count if it is to truly address, in the simple phrase that also serves as the ti-
tle of the book by Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, What Workers Want.
7
I. WHAT WORKERS WANT
Freeman and Rogers's What Workers Want is a book-length treatment
of an ambitious undertaking: the 1994-1995 Worker Representation and
Participation Survey ("WRPS"). s The WRPS provides a fine starting point
for discussions about the kinds of institutions that might represent Ameri-
can workers in the twenty-first century workplace. To the questions of
whether there is a representation gap in the United States, what the gap
looks like, and what those workers who have no representation might want,
the WRPS provides as definitive a set of answers as we might hope to get
from a national survey.
Freeman and Rogers draw on the WRPS to show that a substantial
share of American workers say that they want more influence than they
actually have in a variety of workplace decision-making areas? As Free-
man and Rogers acknowledge, there are a number of ways workers could
address their desires. Most obviously, workers can quit jobs that do not
provide the influence they want, and instead seek out employers who offer
them the kinds of workplaces they prefer.'0 Workers can also ask their em-
ployers to change the ways in which they do things (and eighty-five percent
of the WRPS respondents noted that their employers had "open-door poli-
cies" through which they could pursue individual concerns).' Workers
also have legal protections through the regulatory system: fair labor stan-
dards, equal employment opportunity, occupational safety and health, and
the like (though the WRPS demonstrates that workers overestimate the ex-
tent to which the law protects them in a number of areas).1
2
6. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 145-50.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id. at 4, 40.
10. Id. at 11.
11. Id. at 92. Leo Troy also makes this point, arguing that the pursuit of complaints
accompanied by the ability to quit make up an "individual system of representation," which
satisfies the concerns of most American workers. LEO TROY, BEYOND UNIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 8 (1999).
12. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 118-19.
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Despite the availability of the courts, innovations in personnel poli-
cies, and a relatively unfettered labor market, the WRPS shows that most
American workers also want another way to influence workplace decision-
making: a collective organization that represents their interests."l Under
existing labor law, collective representation is available to workers who or-
ganize into unions for the purpose of bargaining. And indeed, for every
American worker who belongs to a trade union, there are two more who
want unions in their workplace but do not have them.14 But these are not
the only unrepresented workers. Many workers who do not want to be rep-
resented by independent trade unions would like to have some other kind of
collective, deliberative body that is run jointly by representatives of both
management and the workforce.' 5 Existing labor law remains an obstacle
to this alternative approach. Changes in policy have been considered, most
prominently by President Clinton's Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations (the "Dunlop Commission"), but Congress did not
act upon the Commission's report (which drew un part upon the WRPS
data).
16
We ought to take the WRPS findings quite seriously. The WRPS is
comprehensive; as Freeman and Rogers hoped, it is indeed the "mother of
all workplace surveys."' 7 Among its many merits is that it offers answers
not only to simple questions (Do you belong to a union?; Would you vote
for one in your workplace?), but also to questions which break down the
issues in fine detail. For example, the survey contained questions about the
differences between workers' actual influence and their desired influence in
eight key areas of workplace decision making. 8
The WRPS takes a thoughtful approach to problems associated with
surveys, and the book-length treatment allows Freeman and Rogers to dis-
cuss these challenges. The order in which questions are asked, the "prim-
ing" of respondents, the effects of different sampling strategies, and other
similar issues are addressed thoroughly. Further, Freeman and Rogers,
commendably, have made the WRPS data available to all researchers so
that anyone with specialized interests can examine issues small or large
with an eye to multivariate analysis.' 9 The availability of the data, com-
bined with the thorough discussion of the method, allow skeptical readers
to examine Freeman and Rogers's arguments from perspectives other than
13. Id. at 141-43.
14. Id. at 144 (footnote omitted).
15. Id. at 150-51.
16. Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Fact Finding Report,
May 1994.
17. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 16.
18. Id. at 47-51.
19. The data are available and easily downloaded at http://www.nber.org/-freeman/
wrps.html.
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those presented by the authors.
The WRPS treatment of hypothetical scenarios is especially thorough
and inventive, focusing on details of proposed institutions and (in Wave
Two of the WRPS) giving respondents the opportunity to consider various
approaches in writing. A minor quibble might be raised by those who fa-
vor examining precise behaviors rather than examining what individuals
say they might do. Talk is cheap, after all, and one might argue that we
ought to know what workers are willing to surrender in order to receive the
institutions they want.20
It is difficult, however, to do better than the WRPS did while using
survey methods because it is not clear which counterfactuals would be ap-
propriate. For example, asking workers whether they are willing to give up
wages in return for collective representation is consistent with the dictates
of economic theory, which sensibly maintain that you cannot get something
for nothing. Such questions, however, make less sense from the worker's
perspective. Having voiced her desire for more influence over pay, train-
ing, and benefits, and for institutions that will give a worker such influence,
it is hard to imagine what she would make of a question that asked her how
much pay she would be willing to sacrifice in return for such influence.
She more likely expects such influence to improve her pay and benefits,
rather than to cost her money.
Meaningful hypothetical scenarios would have been more compli-
cated. For example, could the WRPS have asked workers whether they
would be happy with institutions that reduced their employers' profits, or
that transferred wealth from the company's shareholders to its employ-
ees?21 We might like to know whether workers are concerned about union
dues or time spent performing union business. The WRPS does show that
most workers would be willing to spend a few hours a month in meetings
(though it did not say at whose expense).22 Wave Two of the WRPS also
provides some evidence that workers would not want management to bear
the entire cost of specific new approaches.23
Beyond the technical aspects of the WRPS method, the central results
simply sound about right regardless of how one might further interpret
them. The WRPS reveals that some workers want no part of collective rep-
resentation, and that many more are skeptical of the benefits of unions but
20. Leo Troy refers to this as the difference between the demand for unions and the "ef-
fective demand," or "desire made real by payment." TROY, supra note 11, at 150. For a
similar analysis of What Workers Want, see Daniel J.B. Mitchell, 53 INDus. & LAB. REL.
REV. 712 (2000).
21. See Brian E. Becker & Craig A. Olson, Unions and Firm Profits, 31 INDUS. REL.
395, 396-415 (1992); see also Martin J. Conyon & Stephen Machin, The Determination of
Profit Margins in UK Manufacturing, XXXIX J. INDUS. ECON. 369, 378 (1991).
22. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 55.
23. Id.
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might be interested in something they understand to be less adversarial
2 4
The WRPS also suggests that a sizeable number of workers believe that in-
stitutions providing them with more influence, including unions, would be
beneficial both for them and for their employers; however, they also be-
lieve that the opposition of managers to such vehicles is a strong impedi-
ment to representation.25 Researchers who have spent time in the field lis-
tening to American workers and managers will find this mix of views
familiar.
II. WORKERS, TRADITIONAL UNIONS, AND THE INFLUENCE GAP
One thing the WRPS clearly tells us is that many more American
workers want traditionally-constituted trade unions than actually have
them. About one-third of workers would vote for a union in a NLRB elec-
tion.26 Some of what workers say they want depends on the framing of the
questions and issues. In addition to asking workers how they would vote in
Phase One, the WRPS asked workers in Phase Two to choose one of three
mechanisms for representation: laws, committees that discussed problems
with management, or labor unions. When the WRPS described unions as
"employee organizations that negotiate or bargain with management,"
thirty-one percent of workers preferred them.27 When unions were de-
scribed as "unions that negotiate or bargain with management," the per-
centage of worker preference dropped to twenty-three percent.28 Freeman
and Rogers note that this distinction did not surprise the union leaders they
spoke with because the reputation of unions is so poor among some work-
ers that the "u-word" provokes a negative reaction even when its functions
29are described neutrally or positively.
Only about a third of non-union workers would like to join a union,
but nearly all of the workers who already belong to unions would vote to
keep their union.30 Freeman and Rogers suggest that this "endowment ef-
fect" provides evidence that, "[o]n average, union workplaces must be ful-
filling the desires of their workers better than nonunion workplaces are ful-
24. Id. at 143-44, 150-52.
25. Id. at 60-63.
26. Id. at 69.
27. Id. at 150.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 150-51. This finding also is consistent with a more general sampling of pub-
lic opinion of trade unions. Since the late 1970s, polls have shown that between one-quarter
and one-third of the United States population generally disapproves of unions. See Paul
Jarley & Sarosh Kuruvilla, American Trade Unions and Public Approval: Can Unions
Please All of the People All of the Time? 15 J. LAB. RES. 97, 101 (1994).
30. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 69.
2001]
426 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 3:3
filling the desires of theirs., 3' Even under this interpretation, the WRPS
results do not provide much of a rationale for anyone looking to "what
workers want" to justify policies that might strengthen union representation
as it is traditionally understood in the United States.
While the WRPS evidence suggests that at least twice as many work-
ers want unions as belong to them,32 so long as union advocates are in the
minority, union members may find themselves in an even smaller minority.
The framework established by the New Deal labor laws and their subse-
quent amendments requires the approval of a majority of workers in the
appropriate bargaining unit in order to establish union recognition. Recog-
nition is accompanied by the assignment to the union of the exclusive right
to bargain for that unit. If the approximately one-third of American work-
ers who want unions were distributed evenly across American bargaining
units, none of those workers would have such representation.
One can offer an argument for labor law reform that would provide
union representation without requiring the approval of the majority of
workers in a bargaining unit. It seems likely that the respondents to the
study, especially those who had no experience with unions, did not give
much thought to this aspect of representation; most of them displayed a
weak understanding of labor and employment law. The survey, however,
even in its treatment of hypothetical institutions, did not ask workers to
consider the benefits of exclusive representation rights for unions.33 The
WRPS does not provide evidence as to whether workers would want mi-
nority unions. It is possible that minority unions, which would almost cer-
tainly have less bargaining power than conventionally recognized unions,
could be one route to the establishment of the less adversarial forms of rep-
resentation in which many workers are interested.
Only a minority of workers want unions, but workers' preferences for
unions are not distributed evenly, so that workers who prefer unions can
make up the majority in some workplaces.34 Freeman and Rogers use the
WRPS to uncover the sorts of workers and workplaces that are more likely
to seek union representation. According to the WRPS, workers who are
more likely to want unions are those reporting low satisfaction with their
influence on workplace decisions, those who are poorly paid, and those
whose employers have no programs for employee involvement.35 For the
most part, workers' own characteristics are less important than those of
their workplaces, with the exception of race. African-Americans are much
more likely than other workers to be in favor of collective representation
31. Id. at 77.
32. Id. at 69.
33. Id. at 142.
34. Id. at 71.
35. Id. at 82.
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through unions.
36
While the WRPS data suggests that workers with relatively low levels
of influence are more likely to favor unionization, the WRPS provides little
evidence to suggest that unions help workers close the "influence gap."
This is the difference between workers' actual and desired influence and
underpins the argument that stronger representation is desirable. On aver-
age, workers in both union and non-union workplaces desire about the
same amount of influence.37 Freeman and Rogers observe that union mem-
38bers report lower average levels of influence than other workers. This ob-
servation may be misleading, since supervisory workers tend to have more
influence and are much less likely to be in unions. Among non-supervisory
workers, union members report more influence and a smaller gap.39 At any
rate, however, these differences are small. The differences in influence de-
sired by nonsupervisory workers who belong to unions and those who do
not are insignificant statistically. n
TABLE ONE
INFLUENCE LEVELS AND INFLUENCE GAPS
1994-1995 WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION SURVEY4
All Workers Supervisory Non-supervisory
Workers Workers
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Influence Influence Influence Influence Influence Influence
Level Gap Level Gap Level Gap
Union 9.6 3.9 10.5 3.3 9.4 4.1
Member
Not Union 9.9 3.7 11.1 2.8 8.9 4.4
Member IIIII
36. Id. at71.
37. The WRPS reveals two important characteristics that differentiate workers in their
desire for workplace influence. Id. at 52 (noting that African-American workers want more
influence than other workers and that female and male workers desire similar levels of in-
fluence). Controlling for occupational category, however, women desire significantly more
influence than do men. The influence gap between men and women is masked by the over-
representation of women in occupations in which workers on average desire less influence.
38. Id.
39. See inifra Table One.
40. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 52.
41. Influence scores range from 4 to 16. The scores are made up of the sums of the an-
swers to four WRPS questions asking employees to assess the level of influence they have
on different kinds of workplace decisions. Gaps represent the differences between actual
and desired levels of influence. Means are weighted.
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The existence of similar influence gaps between union and non-union
workplaces could indicate either that unions do not increase employees' in-
fluence over workplace decisions or, in contrast, that workers typically
form unions in order to change workplaces that otherwise provide them
with little influence. Because the WRPS is restricted to a single time pe-
riod, it does not permit direct examination of this question. The question
can be addressed, however, by taking an indirect approach with the WRPS
data and asking whether unions provide additional influence (or reduce the
influence gap) for workers or for workplaces with similar characteristics.
By focusing on fixed characteristics of workers and workplaces, which
were unlikely to have been affected by unionization, the WRPS data can be
used to estimate multivariate regression models predicting the level of in-
fluence for non-supervisory workers. Estimates from these models are re-
ported in Table two.
TABLE TWO
DETERMINANTS OF SELF-ASSESSED WORKPLACE INFLUENCE
ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS (STANDARD
ERRORS IN PARENTHESES)
1994-1995 WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION SURVEY
NON-SUPERVISORY WORKERS42
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Union Mem- 0.45 0.38 0.32 0.67 0.48 0.08 0.08
bership
(0.33) (0.39) (0.37) (0.33) (0.38) (0.35) (0.39)
Individual --- In- --- --- In- --- In-
characteristics cluded eluded eluded
(occupation,
experience and
experience
squared, age
and age
squared,
dummy vari-
ables for each
of five educa-
42. Influence scores range from 4 to 16. The scores are made up of the sums of the an-
swers to four WRPS questions asking employees to assess the level of influence they have
on different kinds of workplace decisions. Regression models include a constant term and
each observation is weighted. For details on specific questions and weighting, see FREMAN
& ROGERS, supra note 1, at 157.
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tion levels,
race, sex)
Workplace In- --- In- In-
characteristics cluded cluded cluded
(establishment
size, organiza-
tion size, in-
dustry, for-
profit status)
Earnings In- In- --- In-
quartile cluded cluded cluded
Trust in em- --- --- 0.39* 0.48* --- 0.31
ployer (1=Not
at all; 4=A lot)
(0.16) (0.17) (0.18)
Feeling toward --- --- 0.72* 0.63* --- 0.58*
work (l=Does
not want to go;
3=Look for-
ward to it)
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Employee- --- --- --- 0.69* 0.60*
management
committees
(0.29) (0.29)
Town Meet- --- --- --- --- --- 0.81* 0.44
ings
(0.28) (0.27)
Group Open --- --- --- --- 0.78* 0.74*
Door
(0.30) (0.30)
N 593 578 566 587 549 522 481
R-squared 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.21 0.08 0.24
* = statistically significant at p<0.05
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Column one of Table Two provides the baseline estimate for the effect
of unions on employee influence; the statistically insignificant coefficient is
consistent with the lack of difference in mean influence levels between the
two kinds of workplaces reported in Table One. Column two of Table Two
shows that, controlling for workers' characteristics such as race, sex, occu-
pation, education, age, and experience with their current employer, union
membership remains unrelated to workers' reports regarding their influence
over workplace decisions.43 Column three of Table Two reports estimates
of effects of unions on workers' influence while controlling for structural
characteristics of workplaces (rather than of workers): establishment size,
firm size, the primary industry in which the firm operates, and for-profit
status. Again, the union coefficient is insignificant.
Column four considers other aspects of workplace relations: pay,
workers' attitudes, and workers' assessment of their company's approach
to employees. These factors, unlike those considered in columns two and
three, are as likely to be caused by differences in unionization as to indicate
underlying differences in workplaces. Nevertheless, the comparison is in-
teresting. The results reported in column four suggest that workers who re-
port that they do not trust their employers and do not feel good about going
to work also report less influence. It seems that unions, however, provide
significantly more influence for workers once we control for these differ-
ences; this result occurs chiefly because union members are much less
likely to trust their employers (the difference is nearly half a point on a
scale ranging only from one to four). Column five controls for all of these
differences; with all controls in place, the union effect is again statistically
insignificant.
The WRPS data suggest that, all other things being equal, union mem-
bers feel they have no more influence than other workers over key work-
place decisions. It also shows that most workers who do have unions are
satisfied with them and would vote for them again. The conclusion to be
drawn is not that unionization brings to workers the same sorts of influence
as workers in non-union workplaces, but that union workplaces are differ-
ent from non-union workplaces in ways that are not easily measured. Most
likely, these differences lie in the relationships between workers and man-
agers, though we cannot tell to what extent the union is a cause or an effect
of these differences. To take one example beyond differences in trust,
managers in union workplaces, in comparison to managers in non-union
workplaces, report that their workers give suggestions about how to im-
prove productivity and quality less frequently.44 Workers' responses to ex-
43. The results of the analyses reported here and of analyses of the gap between desired
and actual levels of influence are quite similar. I report results only for actual influence here
for the sake of simplicity.
44. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 103, 104.
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actly the same question, however, show no differences between union and
non-union workplaces.45 It may be that managers in unionized workplaces
are not as inclined as other managers to share power voluntarily. These
kinds of differences could pre-date the union; they could also be a result of
union representation.
In any event, the extension of union representation, in the face of pre-
vailing management norms and behaviors, is not likely to reduce the influ-
ence gap much. Advocates for unions may find this discouraging or im-
plausible, but here it is useful to remember some things about the WRPS.
We cannot say to what extent the WRPS results depend on the economic,
legal, and political environment in which the survey was conducted. The
WRPS suggests that in the United States in 1995, workers expect to gain
more of the kinds of influence they really desire when management was
willing to extend such influence, rather than when independent workers'
organizations forced managers to share power through negotiation.46 It
does not say whether unions might be able to achieve more influence for
their members under alternative regimes. History and international com-
parisons suggest that such a result is possible.47 Similar considerations also
suggest, however, that American managers' opposition to unions is espe-
48cially strong and has deep roots.
Managerial opposition impedes the ability of workers to reduce the in-
fluence gap even when they do organize collectively. American workers
see this gap in both halves of the "mixed motive" relationship that charac-
terizes employment.49 As Freeman and Rogers note, the WRPS findings
"fit well with a view of the labor market in which management and em-
ployees are intrinsically linked in a relationship that is both cooperative and
conflictual."50 Workers understand that both labor and management suffer
from "the negotiator's dilemma," in which the behaviors that are effective
in solving problems cooperatively are not the same as those that help par-
ties claim more for themselves.5 Workers identify the largest influence
45. Id.
46. Id. at 40-43.
47. Greg J. Bamber & Russell D. Lansbury, An Introduction to International and Com-
parative Employment Relations, in INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS 1 (Greg J. Bamber & Russell D. Lansbury eds., 1998) (comparing unionization
rates, human resource practices, and other key indicators across countries); HARRY C. KATz
& OWEN DARBISHIRE, CONVERGING DIVERGENCES: WORLDWIDE CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT
SYSTEMS ch. 1 (2000) (same).
48. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 60-63.
49. RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. McKERSiE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM 155-59 (ILR Press 1991)
(1965).
50. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 63.
51. DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITVE GAIN 29-45 (1986).
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gaps in areas where the conflicts tend toward zero-sum economic issues:
pay and benefits.52 The smallest areas of difference between desired and
actual influence are in areas where the benefits of cooperation are clear,
such as scheduling and deciding how work gets done.53 But there are gaps
in all areas, and American workers want more influence on both the con-
flictual and the cooperative sides of their relationships with their employ-
ers. Where management is not willing or able to find ways to work to-
gether with representatives of the workforce it may be that workers sense
that pushing for independent representation is likely to improve their own
lot at the expense of their employer's.
Unionization can force American managers to sit down and deal with
workers even when they really would prefer not to. Many workers would
find this exercise an improvement on the status quo. However, it is un-
likely that workers can achieve what they really want in the workplace
simply by increasing their collective bargaining power. Here, it is useful to
remember that the WRPS finds that workers want "a lot" of influence.
54
Influence gap questions are posed to workers on a four point scale; re-
sponses can range from it being "very important" (scoring four) to "not im-
portant" (scoring one) for the respondent to have "a lot" of influence. In
every one of the eight decision areas the WRPS covers, the modal response
is that a lot of influence is "very important. 55 Perhaps it is not surprising
that American workers believe that achieving this level of influence re-
quires not merely managerial acquiescence, but the active cooperation of
management. Unionization can compel bargaining and compromise, but
collective power does not in itself force management into the kinds of co-
operation for which workers hope.
One further aspect of what workers want merits more attention than
the WRPS gives it. Collective representation helps workers to preserve
dignity in their jobs, particularly by assuring them due process and provid-
ing a counterweight to treatment they perceive to be demeaning or capri-
cious. The Service Employees International Union, for example, has run
many successful organizing campaigns based on appeals to workers to or-
ganize as a means of protecting their respect and dignity in the workplace. 6
It is hard to know how much of the influence gap derives from workers
feeling that their employers do not respect them. Factors such as racial and
gender differences in desired influence suggest such considerations may be
important. 57 Even where unions fail to help workers achieve more influ-
52. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 51-53.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 63.
55. Id. at 49-50.
56. Id. at 53.
57. Id. at 54-55.
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ence over substantive decisions, collective representation gives workers
something that they want in workplaces where they might not otherwise
find it. It would be interesting to know whether workers believe they can
achieve the respect they seek in the workplace without management coop-
eration or whether collective representation is indeed sufficient to improve
matters.
III. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT PROGRAMS
The relationship between the level of employee influence on the one
hand, and the strategies and values of management on the other, is made
clearer by considering the effects of employee involvement ("EL") pro-
grams. Unlike union representation, management-initiated El programs are
positively associated with employee influence.5 ' Tabulations by Freeman
and Rogers show that EI programs are associated with lower influence
gaps.5 9 In column six of Table Two, I report regression estimates that con-
firm these tabulations. 60 The results enable direct comparison of the effects
of EI and unionization. Column six shows that, unlike unions, each of the
three group El programs that the WRPS asked workers to con-
sider-committees of employees that discuss problems with management
on a regular basis, regular town meetings with groups of employees, and an
open door policy for employee groups-is associated with higher levels of
influence for non-supervisory workers.61 Effects of committees and open
door policies are statistically significant even when controlling for all sorts
of differences across workers and workplaces (column seven).
Furthermore, nearly all workers believe that if they gained more influ-
ence they could help improve their employers' lots as well as their own.
For example, the WRPS shows that over eighty percent of workers believe
that if more decisions about production and operations were made by em-
ployees instead of by managers, the company would be a stronger com-
petitor, and the quality of its products or services would improve.62 Inter-
estingly, managers also agree with this notion by only slightly smaller
majorities. 63
Given its effects on influence, El ought to be popular with workers.
Other research supports this notion. A detailed study of workers' attitudes
at Chrysler showed that workers clearly preferred new practices featuring
58. Id. at 6.
59. Id. at 52.
60. See supra Table Two.
61. Again, estimates of effects on the influence gap, rather than on the level of influ-
ence, are unreported, but yielded results similar to those reported here. See FREEMAN &
ROGERS, supra note 1, at 47-60.
62. Id. at 103-13.
63. Id.
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El to a traditional system with less involvement.64 Paul Osterman found
that workers in sites featuring teams and EI seem to have enjoyed no
greater wage gains than those in more traditional settings.65 Osterman sug-
gests that workers may simply prefer these new forms of work organization
to their counterparts, reasoning that influence over workplace decisions
may be a reward in itself.
66
Research suggests that EI also has generally positive effects on firm
performance. 67 Yet we also know that El is continuing to spread only
slowly and unevenly. This slow diffusion of El, according to Freeman and
Rogers, is largely due to the difficulty in implementing programs that are
properly suited to specific workplaces with all of their idiosyncrasies. Here
it is worth considering some of the other evidence on adoption that Free-
man and Rogers do not review in detail. We know that competitive strate-
gies oriented toward international competition, and competition through
product differentiation, are associated with the adoption of these programs.
But it also appears that managerial discretion over work practices plays
quite an important role in the decision to adopt EI.68 For example, Paul
Osterman finds that what he terms "managerial values" are among the most
powerful predictors of adoption of EI.69
What is more, managers may have selfish reasons to use their discre-
tion to avoid EI, since EI changes managers' roles. To take one example,
Jeffrey Pfeffer and colleagues report the results of experiments they per-
formed on MBA students, which demonstrated both a "faith in supervision
effect," in which observers tend to see work performed under the control of
a supervisor as better than identical work done without as much supervi-
sion, and a "self-enhancement effect," which describes managers' tenden-
64. See generally Larry W. Hunter et al., What Makes Teams Take? Employee Reac-
tions to Work Reorganization (July 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Man-
agement Department of the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania).
65. Paul Osterman, Work Reorganization in an Era of Restructuring: Trends in Diffu-
sion and Effects on Employee Welfare, 53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 179, 186 (2000).
66. Id. at 183-84.
67. For good summaries of this evidence, see generally Brian Becker & Barry Gerhart,
The Impact of Human Resource Management and Organizational Performance, 39 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 779 (1996); Casey Ichniowski et al., What Works at Work: Overview and Assess-
ment, 35 INDUS. REL. 299 (1996).
68. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 103-13.
69. For evidence on diffusion, see Osterman, supra note 65, at 186-87 or the series of
studies by Edward Lawler and colleagues, especially EDWARD E. LAWLER m E" AL.,
EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND TOTAL QuALITY MANAGEMENT: PRACTICES AND RESULTS IN
FORTUNE 1000 COMPANIES 9-30 (1992) and EDWARD E. LAWLER, II1 ET AL., CREATING HIGH
PERFORMANCE ORGANIZATIONS: PRACTICES AND RESULTS OF EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND
TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT IN FORTUNE 1000 COMPANIES 9-31 (1995). For evidence on
the determinants of adoption, see Paul Osterman, How Common is Workplace Transforma-
tion, and Who Adopts It?, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 173, 182 (1994), or the above-cited
studies of Lawler and colleagues.
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cies to evaluate work products more highly the more involved they are in
production.70 Both effects, argue Pfeffer et al., may discourage managers
from adopting EI.7 '
El appears to be good for workers and good for firms. Freeman and
Rogers also suggest it is not likely to be bad for unions.72 Fearing that
stronger governmental support for El would result in the substitution of
weak in place of strong representation, organized labor opposed the parts of
the Dunlop Commission report that suggested modification of section
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act to allow more kinds of EI to
thrive. In this vein, two observations based on the WRPS data are worthy
of mention. First, there is no evidence that EI makes workers less inter-
ested in independent representation by unions. The problem for unions lies
in the opposition of management to any kind of independent representation,
not in the substitution of El for such representation. Second, a considerable
number of workers are currently involved in El programs that are, strictly
speaking, in violation of section 8(a)(2)-discussing wages, benefits, and
working conditions.
What most workers really want, Freeman and Rogers conclude, is to
have employers that both accept workers' desire for independent collective
representation and cooperate with the representatives of the workforce.73
If, in practice, cooperation and independence turn out to be exclusive, then
some workers prefer more independence (as with traditional unions), while
others prefer more cooperation, even if their organization requires man-
agement support.74 Freeman and Rogers conclude that giving workers what
they want will require some creativity, but that we ought to find ways to
help workers and firms to establish arenas for discussion, as with some sort
of labor-management committees.75 In short, we need "a system that ad-
mits new institutions as well as extension of current ones. 76
IV. WHO'S THE Boss?
WRPS locates the roots of the representation dilemma in the influence
gap: workers want more influence than they have over important aspects of
their working lives.77 What Workers Want and the WRPS inform the
70. Jeffrey Pfeffer et aL, Faith in Supervision and the Self-Enhancement Bias: Two
Psychological Reasons Why Managers Don't Empower Workers, BASIC AND APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL., Dec. 1998, at 313-21.
71. Id.
72. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 141.
73. Id. at 4-6.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 155.
77. Id. at 161.
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search for institutions that might address the gap, asking whether policy
does all it might to encourage the development of structures in which em-
ployees can collectively discuss issues or negotiate solutions to problems
78with their managers.
Considerable creativity will be required in the design of new forms of
representation if we are to meet the twin imperatives of cooperation and in-
dependence. What Workers Want, and the WRPS, are grounded in a view
of the workplace that understates the diversity of workers' situations. 79 As
with existing labor and employment policy, the survey itself seems to have
been designed primarily for workers and managers in standard employment
arrangements-a necessity if the survey was to be kept to a manageable
length. However, by understating the diversity of contemporary work set-
tings, the WRPS provides only a blurry lens into what workers really want.
In so doing, it understates the ensuing challenges associated with con-
structing policy to support new forms of collective representation.
One set of complications arises from what has been termed "non-
standard work."80 For example, the Bureau of Labor Statistics is able to
identify, in addition to "standard full and part-time workers" and the self-
employed, a number of other categories of work, including agency tempo-
raries, on-call workers, contract company workers, direct-hire temporary
workers, and independent contractors.8l
Non-standard workers differ from other workers in crucial ways. Ex-
isting laws often treat them differently (for example, with respect to the
right to organize or to be protected under employment discrimination laws).
Non-standard workers typically have less attachment to their employers
and may even be unsure as to the identity of their formal employer. They
have some issues to raise with their formal employers (for example, the
owners and managers of temporary agencies) and others to raise with those
who actually direct their work day-to-day. Further, non-standard workers
may also work side-by-side with regular employees while being governed
by different formal employment arrangements.82
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. NONSTANDARD WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGES OF CHANGING EMPLOYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS 3 (Francoise Carre et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter NONSTANDARD WORK].
81. Anne E. Polivka, Contingent and Alternative Work Arrangements, Defined, 119
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 3, 3-9 (1996).
82. Charles Heckscher, HR Strategy and Nonstandard Work: Dualism Versus True Mo-
bility, in NONSTANDARD WORK, supra note 80, at 267, 274.
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TABLE THREE
APPROACHES TO THE JOB AND PREFERENCES FOR REPRESENTATIVE
INSTITUTIONS
1994-1995 WORKER REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION SURVEY
NON-SUPERVISORY WORKERS
If an election Which one of the following three
were held ways would be the most effective
today, would way to increase employees' say in
you vote for workplace matters and to make
or against sure they are treated fairly?
being repre-
sented by a
union?
Which of the % of re- % who would LAWS Joint em- Employee
following spondents vote in favor that ployee and organiza-
best describes in category of union protect manage- tions that
how you the ment NEGOTI-
think of your rights of COMM- ATE of
current job? individ- ITFEES bargain
ual em- that with man-
ployees DISCUSS agement
problems over is-
sues
A LONG- 40.3% 29.4% 12.5% 60.6% 26.9%
TERM job
you will stay
in
An opportu- 16.7% 29.5% 14.6% 61.3% 24.1%
nity of
ADVANCE-
MENT in this
same organi-
zation
Part of 15.3% 36.7% 15.9% 58.5% 25.6%
CAREER or
profession
that will
probably take
you to
DIFFERENT
companies
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If an election Which one of the following three
were held ways would be the most effective
today, would way to increase employees' say in
you vote for workplace matters and to make
or against sure they are treated fairly?
being repre-
sented by a
union?
Which of the % of re- % who would LAWS Joint em- Employee
following spondents vote in favor that ployee and organiza-
best describes in category of union protect manage- tions that
how you the ment NEGOTI-
think of your rights of COMM- ATE of
current job? individ- ITTEES bargain
ual em- that with man-
ployees DISCUSS agement
problems over is-
sues
A job you 27.7% 50.9% 18.7% 50.1% 31.2%
will probably
LEAVE that
is NOT part
of a career
Sample mean 35.4% 15.1% 57.5% 27.4%
While the WRPS did not ask specifically about non-standard work ar-
rangements, it did ask whether workers thought of their job as part of a
long-term attachment to their current employer.83 Table Three shows dif-
ferences in the sorts of institutions non-supervisory workers prefer, de-
pending on how they see their jobs. The WRPS data suggest that workers
who see themselves with short-term attachments to their employers are
relatively more interested in unions, and relatively less interested in more
cooperative forms of EI.84 Non-standard workers likely make up a dispro-
portionate share of this group. The 1998 organization of WashTech, Mi-
crosoft's contract and temporary workers affiliated with the Communica-
tion Workers of America, provides an interesting recent example of
collective organizing of non-standard workers.s We need more knowledge
of the issues that are important to non-standard workers in different situa-
83. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 161.
84. Id.
85. See Virginia L. duRivage, CWA's Organizing Strategies: Transforming Contract
Work into Union Jobs, in NONSTANDARD WoRK, supra note 80, at 377, 385-91.
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tions, the particular problems they face in the workplace, and the kinds of
collective representation they want.
V. Is THERE A Boss?
In addition to the challenges arising from the variety of non-standard
employment arrangements, representation may also be confounded by other
features of contemporary employment that get relatively little attention in
the WRPS. The questions featured in the WRPS tend to characterize
workplace influence as something that is distributed between employees
and their managers. Both sides understand that the process of allocating
this influence need not be an exercise in zero-sum bargaining. Both sides
may also believe, however, that their influence is limited by factors exter-
nal to the employment relationship. Thus, not even the most extensive El
programs may close the gap between workers' desired and actual influence.
These limits also help to explain why managers do not have all of the influ-
ence they want.
Understanding constraints on influence is particularly important in an
age featuring an increasing share of what has been termed "market-
mediated" employment,8 6 in which pay and conditions of work are deter-
mined more by market forces external to firms and less by administrative
rules and procedures that are specific to individual employers.87 Restruc-
turing and re-engineering have created new forms of organization that
"bring the market into the firm." These new structures and processes make
decentralized business units, branch offices, or even individual employees
responsible for local profits and losses. The result is that workers bear
relatively more of the risk associated with business enterprises. Through
restructuring, firms have assigned to the product and labor markets the
workplace control that managers once exercised or shared with workers.
More and more workers, in turn, see the market, rather than manage-
ment, as their boss.88 The influence of the market on the workplace is fur-
ther personalized where workers meet customers. The failure to sell or to
serve customers effectively is likely associated with undesired outcomes
from the workers' point of view: lower pay, a higher likelihood of being
86. Peter Cappelli, Market-Mediated Employment: The Historical Context, in THE NEW
RELATIONSHIP: HUMAN CAPrrAL IN THE AMERicAN CORPORATION 66-90 (Margaret Blair &
Thomas A. Kochan eds., 1999).
87. The quantitative evidence on the decline in the importance of internal labor markets
is mixed, but it appears that less-skilled workers have become relatively more exposed to
the external labor market in recent years. See Annette Bernhardt & Dave E. Marcotte, Is
'Standard Employment' Still What It Used to Be?, in NONSTANDARD WORK, supra note 80,
at 21-40. There may also be increases in other groups' exposure to the market, particularly
as the use of subcontracting and temporary employment arrangements grows.
88. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 21.
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fired, a required change in the way the worker performs her daily job. In
the contemporary workplace, employees may find themselves responding
more to the demands of their customers than to those of their nominal
bosses.
Consider workers in individual branches of large banks. Over the last
ten years, restructuring of financial services has changed dramatically what
many of these workers do. Banks now hold branches directly responsible
for bringing in revenue through the sale of financial services, and new work
practices in some banks give non-managerial workers more discretion over
important decisions in the workplace.8 9 Yet branch workers' pay, job secu-
rity and work hours are now much more heavily influenced by the market:
their salaries and jobs depend on success in selling the bank's products to
customers.
Customers obviously matter to service workers but, even in traditional
manufacturing industries, managers now describe the process of exposing
workers to the desires and demands of customers as good business prac-
tice.9° Exposure to customers takes a variety of forms. Some workers par-
ticipate in enduring customer relationships in which they get to know those
they serve quite well. For others, work is a series of one-time encounters
with customers with whom they will not interact again. Differences in
these kinds of service arrangements in turn have strong influences on
workers' daily lives. 9
Managers may find it expensive and difficult to represent the interests
of customers effectively in discussions with workers; they may not even
want to do so. We might consider whether what workers want could in-
clude vehicles for discussing the terms and conditions of work with cus-
tomers. Such institutions could also benefit customers, since it is costly for
individual customers to express their interests in firms doing things differ-
ently. Customers and workers may have different kinds of information
from which each group could benefit. Managers, customers, and employ-
ees may also have differing time horizons. Individual managers may, for
example, make short-term decisions that have negative consequences for
customers and employees in the long run. Discussions between customers,
employees, and managers might bring new insights into the issues involved
89. See Larry W. Hunter, Transforming Retail Banking: Inclusion and Segmentation in
Service Work, in EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY 153-92 (Peter Cappelli
ed., 1999).
90. For example, Ralph Stayer, CEO of Johnsonville Foods, Inc., explains that a key
piece of devolving decision-making to his employees was making them responsible for re-
sponding to customer complaints about the quality of the sausage that the company made.
Ralph Stayer, How I Learned to Let My Workers Lead, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1990,
at 66, 72.
91. BARBARA A. GUTEK, THE DYNAMICS OF SERVICE: REFLECTIONS ON THE CHANGING
NATURE OF CUSTOMER/PROVIDER INTERACTIONS 64-82 (1995).
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in the design of work, along with better information regarding the kinds of
activities that lead to efficient and high quality service.
Future research on "what workers want" might consider the ways in
which the dynamics of the employer-employee-customer triad affect the
distribution of influence over workplace decisions. For example, it would
be helpful to have more research into how employees interpret their own
interests, and their desire for representation, when they feel caught between
the demands of customers and the demands of employers. The interests of
customers and workers may be very similar. For example, workers in tele-
phone call centers may resent managerial control over the pace at which
they are required to take incoming customer requests; customers, similarly,
may desire that workers treat their calls carefully and thoroughly, and not
rush through them.
On the other hand, from the employees' perspective, the customer is
not always right. Sometimes this perspective conflicts with that of manag-
ers. Customers may make requests that employees find demeaning or ab-
surd, yet managers may insist that the demands of the business require ac-
commodating such requests. Circumstances may also exist under which
both managerial and employee interests directly oppose those of the cus-
tomer. Call center customers, for example, may object to the use of auto-
mated response technology, but both managers and employees find such
technology an efficient substitute for tedious and repetitive work.
Relationships between workers, customers, and managers become
even more complicated when the user is not the payer. Health care, for ex-
ample, may feature alliances between caregivers and patients, both of
whom prefer expensive, high-quality care. Pressure on costs comes from
the relationship between the insurance companies who pay for care and
from the medical centers that organize its provision. Discussions over how
work gets done, and who ought to be paid by whom for doing what, might
be improved through the explicit inclusion of the perspectives of the users
and buyers of goods and services.
One possible outcome of this line of thinking is that tripartite discus-
sions over some aspects of workplace decisions could increase the oppor-
tunities for workers to build coalitions that could help them achieve the
kinds of influence they want. For example, nursing home workers and
their representatives have allied themselves with advocates for the elderly
to demand better patient care and better working conditions for nursing as-
92sistants. Such alliances, no doubt, could raise costs to management; but
they also may uncover cooperative solutions that improve the welfare of all
parties. The WRPS suggests many workers are interested in discussing
92. Susan Eaton, Beyond 'Unloving Care': Linking Human Resource Management and
Patient Care Quality in Nursing Homes, 11 INT'L J. OF HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 591, 596-
602 (2000).
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with management ways to improve the performance of the enterprise, as
well as to enhance their own welfare directly.93 Discussions that include
customer representatives could foster further cooperation between labor
and management, particularly in circumstances in which day-to-day work
is directed as much by customers as by supervisors.
VI. WHERE'S THE Boss?
Yet another challenge in uncovering the kinds of representation work-
ers want lies in identifying the location of decision-making authority inside
the organization. Strategic decisions determine the general shape of the
workplace through the choice of performance measures, the design of busi-
ness units, and through the firms' approaches to competition and restruc-
turing.94 New organizational structures, and specific unit performance cri-
teria, in turn, have substantial effects on workers' abilities to establish and
maintain effective representation. The rules of restructuring for American
firms have been written almost entirely by investors and executives, with
minimal representation of worker interests.95 Aside from a few experi-
ments with labor-management partnership or board representation for trade
unions,96 there are few institutions in the United States that represent
workforce concerns at the level of strategic decision-making. Without in-
put into these decisions, other forms of representation are precariously situ-
ated; the support of local managers for local involvement is not likely to be
sufficient to sustain EI in the face of higher-level indifference or opposi-
tion.
The restructuring process often leads to decentralization of decision-
making, moving authority down to units that are responsible for their own
profits and losses. In principle, decentralization could facilitate more ef-
fective representation for workers, as smaller, decentralized units could be
more congenial arenas for effective joint decision-making. But decentrali-
zation does not guarantee that workplace decisions will be made locally.
Some finms (consider Wal-Mart or McDonald's) operate through structures
that establish decentralized responsibility for profits and losses while plac-
ing great emphasis on homogeneity of operating procedures across loca-
tions.97 The result is that work practices, job definitions and responsibili-
ties, and pay levels may be decided at levels far removed from local
93. FREEMAN AND ROGERS, supra note 1, at 40-42.
94. See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK 46 (1997).
95. Thomas A. Kochan et al., The Transformation of American Industrial Relations 17
(1986).
96. Larry W. Hunter, Can Strategic Participation Be Institutionalized? Union Repre-
sentation on American Corporate Boards, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 557, 558 (1998).
97. Gabriel Szulanski & Sidney Winter, Replication as Strategy, ORG. SC. (forthcom-
ing 2001).
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workplaces, and what workers may want is effective representation at the
higher levels of management where executives make such decisions.
The presence or absence of representation at higher levels also affects
the context in which workers express their local concerns. The absence of
higher-level access, for example, diminishes the importance of the inde-
pendence of local workers' organizations. Local cooperation between
managers and workers is imperative where firms can relocate operations
cheaply and quickly. Independent representation that challenges manage-
ment prerogatives can be undermined simply by threats to move work;
workers attuned to the reality of such situations should highly value coop-
erative relationships with local managers.
Establishing workers' representation at the appropriate levels inside
large, decentralized organizations is even more complicated in the context
of an active market for corporate control, in which investors place tremen-
dous pressure on top managers to achieve high short-term returns. The
emergence of active institutional investors has been accompanied by the
threat of acquisition of firms perceived to be under performing, by con-
tracts for executives that are linked ever more tightly with the stock price of
the firm, and by a higher likelihood of executive turnover should the firm
perform worse than investors' expect.9' This market orientation may make
even high-level representation tenuous, with any agreements between labor
and management subject to the approval of institutional investors and, indi-
rectly, of the stock market itself.
VII. AM I THE BOSS?
The line between employees and managers is often drawn so finely
these days as to render them indistinguishable. As organizations flatten
and EI programs proliferate, this distinction is not going to get any clearer.
Over forty percent of the WRPS respondents, for example, identify them-
selves as having some supervisory responsibilities.99 The self-identifying
supervisors in the WRPS report high levels of participation in EI programs
in comparison to non-supervisory employees, and EI does more to lessen
the influence gap for supervisors than it does for other workers.,0° These
workers are, not surprisingly, relatively less interested in independent rep-
resentation and more interested in cooperation, than are their non-
supervisory counterparts.1
0'
Many employees expect (or at least hope) to be managers one day,
98. MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING
THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA 133-67 (1996).
99. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 10.
100. Id. at 110.
101. Id. at 56-60.
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perhaps even top managers. It is hard to say how many, but Table Two
shows that sixteen percent of the workers who said they had no supervisory
responsibilities also said that their current job was best described as an op-
portunity for advancement inside their company (this was also true of
twenty-five percent of the supervisors). There are reasons to expect the
relative share of employees with managerial aspirations to increase.102 As
more Americans gain higher education, we might expect these workers to
strive to advance to management positions. Over half of the non-
supervisors in the WRPS have attended college, for example, and nearly a
quarter of them already have at least a bachelor's degree.0 3 Managerial
ambitions might also be important for the increasing share of professional
and technical workers. Some of this work is becoming more routinized;
where this is so, employees may become interested in advancing to jobs in
which they can exercise supervisory authority.'O And even where jobs re-
main fairly autonomous, as in the case of scientists and engineers, ad-
vancement in these areas often requires taking on managerial responsibili-
ties.l05 The perceived likelihood of promotion from a job featuring low
levels of influence into a job with higher levels of influence may have ef-
fects on what kinds of representation workers want.
Under some circumstances, workers view low levels of influence as a
temporary condition, or as an aspect of initiation into an organization. In
professional service industries such as law, accounting, or investment
banking, for example, new associates in large firms perform tedious tasks
under difficult working conditions, with very little influence over their
work.' 6 Yet the WRPS did not ask much about promotions, an aspect of
work about which these kinds of workers are likely to be quite interested.
Attention to promotion may undermine workers' interest in collective rep-
resentation, especially where promotion opportunities are structured as a
"tournament."' 0 7 While workers might have some interest in establishing
fair and consistent rules for promotions, a diversity of views among such
employees about the distribution of rewards is likely to hamper their ability
to represent their concerns collectively. Employees who expect to gain
promotion may also be interested in preserving their future ability to exer-
cise managerial discretion. Low levels of influence are also more accept-
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id.
104. J. Richard Hackman, What is Happening to Professional Work? 2 PERSP. ON WORK,
1, 4-6 (1998).
105. See generally Thomas J. Allen & Ralph Katz, The Dual Ladder Motivational Solu-
tion or Managerial Delusion? 16 R&D MGMT. 185 (1986).
106. Peter D. Sherer, Leveraging Human Assets in Law Firms: Human Capital Struc-
tures and Organizational Capabilities, 48 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 671, 673 (1995).
107. See Brian G.M. Main et al., Top Executive Pay. Tournament or Teamwork? 11 J. oF
LAB. ECON. 606, 606-09 (1993).
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able where workers believe that internal systems of promotions give man-
agement a sense of non-supervisory employees' interests, thereby reducing
the need for more formal representation.
VIII. WHAT WORKERS WANT
American workers want more collective representation.""8 Ideally,
such representation would have some independence from management, but
would provide advocacy while improving, and not weakening, their em-
ployers' abilities to confront business problems. Freeman and Rogers con-
clude from the WRPS findings that the most pressing need for reform of
policy governing workforce representation is to find ways to permit a di-
versity of forms to flourish.1° 9 They arrive at this conclusion despite their
underestimation of the diversity of contemporary workplaces and worker
interests.
Non-standard work arrangements, the increasing involvement of cus-
tomers and clients in the workplaces, and the representation of workers'
interests at multiple levels of management in which the players keep shift-
ing, all raise challenges for us in understanding what workers really want.
These challenges themselves play out in contexts that are even more di-
verse. The geographic dispersion of the workplace differs across firms and
industries, as do the technological and strategic bases for distinctions be-
tween labor and management, and these factors themselves change over
time. For example, even as banks decentralize their branch systems and
empower local employees to win customers, they are gathering large num-
bers of employees together in telephone call centers to perform tedious,
low-paying jobs over which workers have little influence.1
Perhaps most critically, the values of managers also differ across
firms. It is conventional to observe that managers who do not seek profits
will be punished by the market. It is less commonly observed that there is
uncertainty among managers or among markets about how to connect deci-
sions that affect workers to forecasts of firm prosperity. Some managers
may focus on the costs of either allowing extensive worker influence.
There are also costs of failing to extend worker influence, however, and
managers retain considerable discretion in making these kinds of choices.
The kinds of representation that American workers want may depend
heavily on the values their managers hold, and in turn, on workers' under-
standing of those values and how tightly they expect their managers to
108. See FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 40.
109. Id. at 155.
110. Jacqueline Day, Level Playing Field at First Union Call Centers, BANK SYS. &
TECH., May 1994, at 35-37; Roberto M. Fernandez et al., Social Capital at Work: Networks
and Employment at a Phone Center 105 AM. J. Soc. 1288, 1298-1300 (2000).
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cling to them. The benefits of EI and collective representation seem clear,
yet appear to be under valued by many managers. As long as managers
strive first to protect their own decision-making discretion, workers can al-
ways expect to find an influence gap, regardless of their independent col-
lective representation. For their part, workers well understand that the
workplace contains both genuine conflicts of interest and large areas of
shared interest. Most employees want to work together with their employ-
ers to improve their firms' prospects as well as their own welfare, yet many
of them feel thwarted.
Those interested in the extension of workplace democracy may find
this outlook bleak, particularly because collective representation in the
workplace is a fundamental human right, and a way for workers both to
protect their own dignity and to exercise influence. Such observers might
take some comfort in a recent phenomenon: the rise to prominence of
shareholder theory. Just two decades ago the idea that firms exist solely to
maximize shareholder value was an obscure set of academic ideas; today it
has a dominant effect on practice and provides the intellectual underpin-
ning for much of the contemporary business school curriculum."' Ironi-
cally, perhaps, the extension of these ideas has also undermined concep-
tions of the firm in practice as a unitary set of interests. Conflicts between
various parties inside organizations have been firmly established as legiti-
mate areas of management concern with the ascendance of economics-
based agency theory.
Thus, the stage has been set for considering "what workers want" as a
matter of policy. The development of research and instructional programs
that take seriously the collective expression of employee interests has the
potential to be as influential as shareholder theory has been. We know that
workers want the ability to organize collectively and independently, and
also to cooperate with management. We might begin to concentrate more
on how we will identify independence and cooperation when we see them.
Attention to detailed aspects of the process of worker organizing, for ex-
ample, may yield less insight than careful study of the outcomes of experi-
ments with a richer variety of representation schemes.
The WRPS findings provide extensive opportunities for researchers
and teachers, especially those who study management and instruct future
managers. Identification of such opportunities pales in difficulty compared
to the challenges of designing public policy to move the hearts and minds
of management. Such difficulties in turn strengthen Freeman and Rogers'
argument for policy that would support a diversity of representational
forms.1 12 Effective representation is likely to vary depending on context,
111. See generally ALLAN A. KENNEDY, THE END OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE:
CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS (2000).
112. FREEMAN & ROGERS, supra note 1, at 155.
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and effectiveness is a fundamental requirement if influence is not to be un-
dermined by management opposition. New policy approaches ought to
continue to allow employees to organize independently and to work to-
gether with their managers. These policy approaches should also be rela-
tively open to a variety of forms through which these two processes might
occur. Such policies would allow more experimentation with different
structures, and would allow a range of strategies to be pursued in providing
collective representation across the diverse population of American work-
places.
